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Abstract.  Neoclassical economists argue that competition promotes efficiency.  They 
consider technology as given though.  In the long run technological progress is an 
important determinant of the level of welfare and Schumpeter argued that monopoly 
rents help entrepreneurs to capture the gains of R&D and hence to invest in it.  We 
investigate the overall effect of competition on performance.  Performance is 
measured by TFP-growth.  As a negative measure of competition we use rent.  Rent is 
defined as the excess factor rewards over and above their perfectly competitive values 
(marginal productivities).  Input-output analysis enables us to calculate rent for the 
Canadian sectors over a thirty-year period and to decompose it in its capital and labor 
components.  In line with the literature we find that rent has no significant influence 
on productivity.  We find an interesting result however: the components influence 
performance in opposite directions.  Capital rent has a positive role and labor rent a 
negative one.  The neoclassical economists and Schumpeter seem both right, but the 
mechanisms differ.  The use of rent as a source of funding for R&D applies to capital 
and the argument that rent yields slack pertains to labor. 
 
Keywords: competition, rent, TFP, Schumpeter hypothesis 
JEL codes: L16, O41, C67
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1. Introduction 
 
Is competition good for performance? Yes, say neoclassical economists, arguing that 
it eliminates slack and hence promotes static efficiency. No, say Schumpeter and 
others, pointing out that monopoly rents induce entrepreneurs to invest in R&D and 
thus promote dynamic efficiency. The mechanisms alluded to are quite different and 
the overall effect of competition becomes an empirical issue.  Nickell (1996) finds 
some support for the view that competition improves performance, but the evidence is 
not overwhelming.  Aghion et al. (2001, 2002) and Boone (2001) argue that the 
relationship between competition and innovation is non-monotonic.  Griffith (2001) 
finds that product market competition improves performance in principal-agent type 
firms.  We will review the argument in some detail and then pitch our approach. 
 
If a market is more competitive, the stakes of sweeping it by winning an innovation 
contest are greater, as the scope is wider.  On a product-by-product basis, however, 
margins are lower in a more competitive market.  Aghion et al. (2001) combine the 
two countervailing effects in a single model, where industries are duopolies engaged 
in price (Bertrand) competition.  ‘Competition’ is measured by the elasticity of 
substitution between the duopolists’ products.   A higher degree of substitutability 
boosts the reward to an innovation winner among leveled firms (the neoclassical 
effect), but reduces the (marginal) reward to non-leveled firms (the Schumpeterian 
effect).  A level field will become less leveled and the new equilibrium is less 
congenial for innovation: followers face low rents to gain when demand is more 
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elastic, while leaders do not distance themselves further as technological knowledge is 
assumed to spill over anyway after a single period.  Industries become less leveled 
and the rent dissipation effect overtakes the contest effect.  Competition and 
innovation have an inverted U relationship as a result.  In a Hotelling-style example of 
three vendors Boone (2001) finds a U relationship and notes that “basically anything 
can happen,” but Aghion et al. (2002) find empirical support for the inverted U 
relationship between competition and innovation. 
 
Since Aghion et al. (2001, 2002) measure competition by means of the elasticity of 
substitution, both the neoclassical and the Schumpeterian effects are channelled 
through the product markets.  This is also the market studied by Griffith (2001), who 
suggests, however, that agency costs play a role in the scope for performance.  We 
want to analyze the role of factor markets.  Do not neoclassical economists argue that 
competition is good because it keeps managers sharp?  And does not Schumpeter 
argue that monopoly profits are good because they fund R&D?  Labor and capital 
may play conflicting roles in terms of the relationship between competition and 
performance.  This conflict may explain why there is no simple relationship between 
the two.     
 
Rather than relating rents to elasticities of demand in a neoclassical model of price 
competition, we decompose rents into factor components in a classical input-output 
framework and investigate if the opposing effects of competition operate through 
different markets.  A natural thought seems to be that competition in the labor market 
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may be good, but competition in the capital market may be bad, both in terms of 
performance.  In other words, neoclassical and Schumpeterian economists may both 
be right, but rather than combining the opposing effects in some nonlinear 
relationship, we point to different factor markets.  The potential policy conclusions 
would be vastly different.  The aforementioned literature may suggest an optimal level 
of product market competition at best.  We say at best, because competition is 
modeled as a shift in consumers’ preferences (more substitutability) and firms are 
assumed to (Bertrand) price compete throughout.  In this paper, however, departures 
from competition are modeled directly as rents and factor markets are targeted.        
 
What do we mean by competition and performance?  The measurement of 
performance is relatively straightforward. Solow (1957) has demonstrated for 
perfectly competitive economies that the shift of the production possibility frontier, 
which is the ultimate determinant of the standard of living, is measured by total factor 
productivity growth (TFP). TFP is also the relevant measure for the standard of living 
in non- or less competitive economies, where it measures not only the shift of the 
frontier, but also the change in efficiency (Nishimizu and Page, 1972). In short, we let 
performance be measured by TFP. 
 
The measurement of competition is trickier. The industrial organization literature 
provides a number of indices. Perhaps concentration indices are the most popular 
ones, but we will not employ them. We believe that industries with a low number of 
firms may well be competitive. In the tradition of Lerner (1934) we measure market 
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power more directly by the extent that price has been raised over cost, i.e. by rent. 
Indeed, Nickell (1996) finds that rent is the most important determinant in the 
assessment of the influence of competition on performance, but rent is hard to 
measure. Nickell takes the difference between the rates of return on company capital 
and treasury bonds and admits this merely measures capital rent, and even as such is 
only a rough proxy; neoclassical economists point out that competition stamps out 
labor rent. 
 
In the spirit of Nickell we take rent as the (negative) measure of competition and 
define it by the difference between actual and perfectly competitive rewards. Actual 
rewards are given by value-added and perfectly competitive rewards by factor costs at 
shadow prices. To determine the latter we need a general equilibrium model, which 
may have been the main obstacle in assessing the role of competition in the 
performance of an economy.  We do so by analyzing Canadian input-output data over 
the period 1962-1991.  Rent and TFP are determined at a level of aggregation that is 
more macro- than micro-economic. 
 
Section 2 presents the model we employ to determine competitive valuations. Then, in 
section 3, we define rent and impute it to capital and labor. Section 4 investigates the 
relationship between competition and performance (as measured by rent and TFP, 
respectively). 
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2. The productivity model 
 
Both competition and performance are related to productivity. For performance the 
connection to productivity is straightforward, as it is measured by TFP, the growth of 
(total factor) productivity.  The connection between competition and rent is slightly 
more indirect.  Competition is (negatively) measured by rent.  Rent is the difference 
between actual and perfectly competitive rewards, where the latter are essentially 
marginal productivities. 
 
The standard approach to productivity is neoclassical TFP analysis, where output and 
input components are combined into indices using value shares as weights. The 
acceptance of value shares at face value is equivalent to taking factor rewards for 
granted and this procedure has been justified for perfectly competitive economies 
(Solow 1957 and Jorgenson and Griliches 1967). We, however, are interested in the 
difference between observed and competitive rewards, and, therefore, cannot apply 
the standard procedure, but must derive productivities from the real input and output 
data of the economy. 
 
The model is input-output in spirit, but we admit different numbers of industries and 
of commodities, as in activity analysis. Industries transform factor inputs and 
intermediate inputs into outputs and the net output commodity vector feeds domestic 
final demand and net exports. The marginal productivities of the factor inputs are the 
shadow prices associated with the factor constraints of the program that maximizes 
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welfare. Now if we assume that producers use Leontief technologies and end users of 
the commodities have Leontief preferences, then the formulas governing these 
shadow prices are perfectly consistent with neoclassical growth accounting and, 
moreover, capture the efficiency change effect of frontier analysis; see ten Raa and 
Mohnen (2000). 
 
The model maximizes the level of domestic final demand, given its commodity 
proportions and subject to material balances, factor constraints, and balance of 
payments. 
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The variables ),,( gcs  and parameters (all other) are the following [with dimensions 
in brackets] 
 
s activity vector [# of industries] 
c level of domestic final demand [scalar] 
g vector of net exports [# of tradable commodities] 
e unit vector of all components one 
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T transposition symbol 
f domestic final demand [# of commodities] 
V make table [# of industries by # of commodities] 
U use table [# of commodities by # of industries] 
J 0-1 matrix placing tradable [# of commodities by # of tradables] 
F potential final demand [# of commodities] 
K capital stock matrix [# of capital types by # of industries] 
M capital endowment [# of capital types] 
L labor employment row vector [# of industries] 
N labor force [scalar] 
π  U.S. relative price row vector [# of tradable] 
tg  vector of net exports observed at time t [# of tradable] 
D observed trade deficit [scalar] 
 
We denote the shadow prices associated to the constraints of program (1) by p  (a row 
vector of commodity prices), r  (a row vector of capital productivities), w  (a scalar 
for labor productivity), ε  (a scalar for the purchasing power parity), and σ  (a row 
vector of slacks for the sectors). Then the dual constraints read 
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The first dual constraint equates value added to factor costs for active industries 
(which have zero slack according to the theory of linear programming), all at shadow 
prices. The second dual constraint normalizes the level of commodity prices by the 
multiplicative constant we entered in the objective function of (1). The third dual 
constraint aligns the prices of the tradable commodities with the terms of trade. 
 
Capital and labor productivity are given by shadow prices r and w  (and foreign debt 
productivity by ε ). In total, frontier productivity growth amounts 
 
 )/()/()(
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pffpDwNrMDNwMrFP −++++= εε  (3) 
 
and is the sum of the Solow residual, 
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and the terms-of-trade effect, 
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following ten Raa and Mohnen (2000). The Solow residual is a Domar weighted 
average of industry Solow residuals, 
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iSR  = [p(V
T – U)··i – rK·i – wL·i]/pVT·i (6) 
 
where the Domar weights are 
 
 pVT·i si / (pFi) (7) 
 
according to Mohnen and ten Raa (2000).   
 
 
3. Rent 
 
In a broad sense, rent comprises all payments made to factor inputs for the provision 
of their services: The owner of a building collects rent from the businesses that use the 
space and a worker receives compensation for the labor provided. This broad concept 
of rent includes not only the opportunity costs of the services but also the bonuses that 
reflect distortions such as market power. The narrow concept of rent, however, is 
limited to these bonuses and, therefore, consists of the excess payments over and 
above the opportunity cost. It is the latter concept of rent that we use to measure 
departures from competition. 
 
The first dual constraint of (2) is the value relationship between value-added and 
factor costs when prices are competitive.  It has its counterpart for observed prices, 
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which we denote by p°, r°, and w° for commodities, capital, and labor, respectively, 
where the superscript indicates ‘observed’. Thus,  
 
p°(VT – U) = r°K + w°L + σ° (8) 
 
Here σ° is defined residually and represents profits. 
 
We define rent as the difference between observed value-added, row vector p°(VT – 
U) and competitive value-added, row vector p(VT – U). This expression defines rent 
by sector.  We can impute rent (in each sector) to the factor suppliers.  Substitution of 
(2) and (8) yields the following expression: 
 
 Rent = (r° - r)K + (w° - w)L +  (σ° + σ) (9) 
 
In words, rent is the sum of capitalists’ rent, workers’ rent, and excess profits. Often 
capitalists’ rent and excess profits are pooled, to define K-rent, (r° - r)K + (σ° + σ).  
Similarly denoting workers’ rent (w° - w)L  by L - rent, we obtain 
 
 Rent = K-rent + L-rent (10) 
 
Notice that each term in (10) is a row vector of industry rents. The consolidation of 
profits into capital rent is apt for economies where profits accrue to shareholders, 
rather than workers, i.e. capitalism. All the rent terms represent excess payments, over 
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and above competitive values, so that rent is a negative measure for competitiveness. 
This is in the spirit of Nickell (1996), who captures capital rent by putting r  = 
treasury bills rates and σ = 0, and who misses labor rent. We fill the gaps by letting 
our general equilibrium model determine the shadow prices. 
 
 
4. Competition and performance 
 
The standard approach to measuring the impact of competition on performance is to 
regress the Solow residual (representing performance) on capital rent (representing 
the departure from competition): 
 
 βα +=itSR K-rent itit ε+  (11) 
 
A positive role of competition would be signaled by a negative value of β.  
Coefficient α represents technological progress due to all other reasons, including 
R&D, which we will consider later. itε  is an error term, i.i.d. N(0,σ
2). For our panel of 
Canadian industries, described in the Appendix, we find β = 0.0005 with .54.1=t  
Coefficient β has the sign that agrees with the Schumpeterian perspective, but is not 
significant. 
 
Now let us widen our (negative) measure of competition to all rent. Then regression 
equation (11) becomes 
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 βα +=itSR Rent itit ε+  (12) 
 
The competition coefficient flips to β = -0.005 with ,57.1−=t  assuming the 
neoclassical sign, but is not significant either. Still, it may that capital rent and labor 
rent influence performance in different ways, and, therefore, it is interesting to 
investigate the effects separately.  Hence we regress 
 
 KitSR βα += K-rentit Lβ+ L-rentit itε+  (13) 
 
For this equation we find 0001.0−=Kβ )19.0( −=t and 0011.0−=Lβ ).86.2( −=t  The 
labor rent coefficient is negative and significant, lending support to the neoclassical 
viewpoint that competition is good, but limiting the mechanism to the labor market. 
 
The preceding analysis pools all the data and it is natural to consider time and industry 
effects. Time effects in standard productivity analysis supposedly capture business 
cycle effects. In our model, however, we have already disentangled TFP into frontier 
productivity growth and efficiency change (see ten Raa and Mohnen 2000) and the 
above Solow residuals decompose the frontier productivity growth component only. 
Therefore we do not analyze time effects in the above equations. The relationship 
between competition and performance may be industry specific though. Hence we 
consider industry effects by making the fixed effects, α, industry specific, so that they 
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become αi. The first regression result, based on regression equation (11), with industry 
effects αi, yields 
 
 0008.0=β )83.1( =t  (11A) 
 
The influence of capital rent preserves the Schumpeter sign and renders it nearly 
significant, in fact significant at the 7% level. Repeating the widening of our 
(negative) measure of competition to all rent, regression equation (12), with industry 
effects αi, yields 
  
 0004.0=β )85.0( =t  (12A) 
  
which is still insignificant. Finally we consider capital and labor rent separately, in 
regression equation (13), with industry effects αi: 
 
 0008.0=Kβ ),38.1( −=t 0001.0−=Lβ )16.0( −=t  (13A) 
 
As before, the sign of capital rent is Schumpeterian and the sign of labor rent is 
neoclassical, but the coefficients are no longer significant. 
 
Let us summarize the evidence, however weak. On itself, capital rent exerts a positive 
influence on performance and it is nearly significant if industry effects are taken into 
account. Total rent has no significant influence. When capital and labor rents enter the 
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equation separately, labor rent has a negative influence on performance and it is 
significant in the pooled regression. 
 
The conflict between neoclassical and Schumpeterian economists on the role of 
competition has never been resolved by the evidence. When rent is disaggregated into 
capital rent and labor rent, some dim light is thrown on the issue. Both Schumpeter 
and the neoclassical economists may be right, but their mechanisms are channeled 
through different markets, namely the capital and labor markets, respectively. In 
hindsight this should not come as a surprise. Schumpeter's argument, that departures 
from competition may yield positive contributions to dynamic efficiency, was built on 
the role of R&D, particularly the way it is financed. The neoclassical argument, that 
competition is good, has been built on the insight that it eliminates slack, particularly 
managerial laziness. Upon closer inspection, the arguments point at different factor 
markets and may both apply. 
 
 
5. R&D 
 
In the empirical literature there is a consensus that R&D has a positive rate of return 
and hence a positive effect on TFP.  To double-check the hypothesis of a Schumpeter 
effect from capital rent on productivity, we have regressed R&D on the input-rent 
components.  Empirical studies on the determinants of R&D (Cohen and Levin 
(1989)) find strong evidence in favor of the technological opportunity effect.  The 
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latter is not easy to measure and generally approximated by industry dummies.  We 
have therefore regressed the pooled data with industry dummies.  Besides 
technological opportunity, they also capture industry-specific innovation policies.  We 
regress by ordinary least squares the pooled data of R&D stock on capital rent and 
labor rent, each lagged by one period to correct for simultaneity bias: 
 
 KitDR βα +=& K-rentit Lβ+ L-rentit itε+  (14) 
 
The regression yields the following results1: 
 
            45.0=Kβ  (t = 2.03), 45.0−=Lβ  (t = -1.83)                             (15) 
 
The regression thus confirms that capital-rents encourage R&D as was hypothesized 
by Schumpeter.  The existence of labor-rents is associated with lower R&D. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have investigated the influence of competition on performance. Performance was 
measured by Solow residuals derived from a general equilibrium model that 
                                                          
1Jeroen Hinloopen has noticed that the regression coefficients are exact opposites and suggested that 
there may be a collinearity.  By definition, rent is the difference between observed and competitive 
value-added.  The latter depends on the competitive prices.  In general equilibrium analysis, including 
this study, the level of the competitive prices is indeterminate.  It is controlled by the multiplicative 
factor in the objective function, see (1), and can be set such that competitive value-added matches 
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maximizes the standard of living. The factor rewards are shadow prices, which are not 
necessarily equal to the observed rewards. In fact, the difference is rent, which we 
take as the (negative) measure of competition. Overall rent has no significant 
influence on performance. On itself, capital has a mild positive influence, and when 
taken into account separately with labor rent, the latter has a mild negative influence. 
Schumpeter and the neoclassical economists may both be right, but their mechanisms 
are channeled through different factor markets, namely the capital and labor markets, 
respectively.  The use of rent as a source of funding for R&D applies to capital and 
the argument that rent yields slack pertains to labor.  
 
If capital rent is positive for performance, but labor rent negative, the policy issue 
emerges how to promote technological progress without skewing the income 
distribution too much. An intelligent policy suggestion would be to reallocate the 
Schumpeterian advantages of capital rents to workers by providing them with stock 
options. This practice is spreading in the Western world and may indeed reconcile the 
opposite roles of capital and labor competition in performance. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
observed value-added, whence total rent is zero.  However, this collinearity is in the data, not in the 
dependent variables.  The exact oppositeness of the regression coefficients is an artifact.   
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Appendix 
 
The constant price input-output tables obtained from Statistics Canada are expressed 
in 1961 prices from 1962 to 1971, in 1971 prices from 1971 to 1981, in 1981 prices 
from 1981 to 1986, and in 1986 prices from 1986 to 1991. All tables have been 
converted to 1986 prices using the chain rule. For reasons of confidentiality, the tables 
contain missing cells, which we have filled using the following procedure. The 
vertical and horizontal sums in the make and use tables are compared with the 
reported line and column totals, which do contain the missing values. We select the 
rows and columns where the two figures differ by more than 5% from the reported 
totals, or where the difference exceeds $250 million. We then fill holes or adjust cells 
on a case by case basis filling in priority the intersections of the selected rows and 
columns, using the information on the input or output structure from other years, and 
making sure the new computed totals do not exceed the reported ones. 
 
There are three capital types, namely buildings, equipment, and infrastructure.2 The 
gross capital stock, hours worked and labor earnings are from the KLEMS database of 
Statistics Canada, described in Johnson (1994). In particular, corrections have been 
made to include in labor the earnings of the self-employed, and to separate business 
and non-business labor and capital. The total labor force figures are taken from 
                                                          
2 Statistics Canada calls them ''building constructions,'' ''equipment'' and ''engineering constructions.'' 
Alternatively we could have modeled capital as being sector-specific, the so-called putty-clay model. 
We prefer the present hypothesis of mobility of each type of capital across sectors for three reasons. 
First, to let the economy expand, we would have needed capacity utilization rates, which are badly 
measured and unavailable for a number of service sectors. Second, to relieve a numerical collinearity 
problem, we would have to relieve the capital constraint on the non-business sector. Third, the 
 19
Cansim (D767870) and converted in hours using the number of weekly hours worked 
in manufacturing (where it is the highest). Out of the 50 industries, neither labor nor 
capital stock data exist for sectors 39, 40, 48, 49, 50, and no capital stock data for 
industry 46. The capital stock for industry 46 has been constructed using the 
capital/labor ratio of industry 47 (both industries producing predominantly the same 
commodity). 
 
The international commodity prices are approximated by the U.S. prices, given that 
70% of Canada's trade is with the United States. We have used the U.S. producer 
prices from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Employment Projection. 
The 169-commodity classification has been bridged to Statistics Canada's 94-
commodity classification. As the debt constraint in (1) is given in Canadian dollars, 
we convert U.S. prices to Canadian equivalents. We have used, whenever available, 
unit value ratios, (UVRs, which are industry specific) computed and kindly provided 
to us by Gjalt de Jong (1996). The UVRs are computed using Canadian quantities 
valued at U.S. prices. For the other commodities, we have used the purchasing power 
parities (PPP) computed by the OECD (which are based on final demand categories). 
The UVRs establish international price linkages for 1987, the PPPs for 1990 in terms 
of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar. We hence need two more transformations. First, 
U.S. dollars are converted to Canadian dollars using the exchange rates taken from 
Cansim (series 0926/133400). Second, since the input-output data are in 1986 prices, 
we need the linkage for 1986, which is computed by using the respective countries' 
                                                                                                                                                                      
combination of 11 non-tradable and sector-specific capacity expansion limits is too stringent. It would 
lead to a high shadow price on construction commodities and zero shadow prices almost anywhere else. 
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commodity deflators: the producer price index for the U.S. (see above) and the total 
commodity deflator from the make table (except for commodities 27, 93 and 94, for 
which we use the import deflator from the final demand table) for Canada. Finally, 
international commodity prices are divided by a Canadian final demand weighted 
average of international commodity prices to express them in real terms. 
 
The following commodities are considered non-tradable: services incidental to 
mining, residential construction, non-residential construction, repair construction, 
retail margins, imputed rent from owner occupied dwellings, accommodation & food 
services, supplies for office, laboratories & cafeterias, and travel, advertising & 
promotion, for which no trade shows up in the input-output tables for most of the 
sample period. 
 
The structure of some non-tradability constraints implies the equality of the activity 
levels of ''construction'' and final demand, ''owner-occupied dwellings'' and final 
demand, and ''printing and publishing'' and ''travel, advertising and promotion.'' We 
have forced the activity level of industry 39 (government royalties on natural 
resources, which essentially pertains to oil rigging in Alberta) to follow industry 5 
(crude petroleum and natural gas) to ensure there are no such royalties without oil 
rigging. A more detailed documentation of the data and their construction is available 
from the authors upon request. 
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